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The study of multilevel governance (MLG) is fundamentally concerned with the capacity of 
multilevel governance to effectively deal with policy problems. However, the notion of 
problem-solving itself remains vague. Moreover, MLG research prioritizes questions of 
structure and agency, while neglecting the role and nature of policy problems themselves. This 
symposium defines problem-solving in both procedural and operational terms. The introduction 
reviews relevant attributes of policy problems and existing assumptions about their influence 
on problem-solving. By adding uncertainty, tractability, and three political attributes (power, 
conflict, salience), we propose an extended list of attributes of policy problems that matter for 
problem-solving, and link them to different notions of procedural and operational problem-
solving in MLG. The contributions address the challenges facing problem-solving in the 
European Union, adopting a particular focus on the characteristics of policy problems. 
Empirical cases include the European Semester, Brexit, the governance of the swine flu 
pandemic, and climate change. 
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“Not all problems are created equal. Problem-solving approaches that are effective for one 
sort of problem are not likely to work for other sorts.”  
Chisholm (1995:472) 
 
This symposium highlights the importance of accounting for the characteristics of policy 
problems in understanding problem-solving dynamics in multilevel systems. Multilevel 
polities, such as the European Union (EU), facilitates the governance of “wicked” 
transboundary policy problems such as environmental governance or health risks (Adelle and 
Russel 2013). These problems need to be tackled with an approach that goes beyond the 
boundaries of the nation state. At the same time, however, maintaining and reforming multilevel 
systems can open up policy challenges themselves (Maggetti and Trein 2019). The current 
legitimacy challenges facing the EU illustrate this dilemma: on the one hand, the EU derives its 
justification as a governance system above the nation state partly from its problem-solving 
capacity resulting in high output legitimacy (Schmidt 2013). On the other hand, the intensified 
political integration that came along with it is meeting fierce resistance, as recently expressed 
in the Brexit vote. 
Multilevel governance constitutes a “system of continuous negotiation among nested 
governments at several territorial tiers—supranational, national, regional and local” (Hooghe 
and Marks 2003), such as the EU. Therein, decision-making is shared between public and 
private actors situated at different levels (Benz 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2016). Multilevel 
governance systems vary in their degree of political, institutional and policy integration as well 
as in their extent of functional differentiation (see, Hooghe and Marks 2016; Trein 2017). 




integrate different levels to deal with a given policy challenge (Hooghe and Marks 2003, 237-
9); Leuffen et al. 2012).  
Although scholars have frequently referred to problem-solving in multilevel governance, since 
the early scholarship (e.g., Scharpf 1997; Benz; 2000) to more recent literature (e.g., Lodge and 
Wegrich 2014; Falkner 2016), the concept has remained somewhat fuzzy and metaphorical. 
Yet, understanding the capacity to solve complex policy problems is crucial for maintaining 
multilevel structures such as the EU. A recent collection of articles examined how structural 
factors affect problem-solving (Trein et al. 2019b) by specifically pointing out how multilevel 
arrangements can also generate new problems (Maggetti and Trein 2019). In the present 
symposium, we argue that the attributes of policy problems are important for understanding the 
processes, outputs and outcomes of multilevel governance settings (Peters 2005; Thomann 
2018a, b), and therefore, for their problem-solving capacity. Problem-solving in multilevel 
systems is particularly relevant with respect to problems which imply high degrees of 
uncertainty with regard to risks, technologies and consequences of policies (Head, 2008). 
However, the relevant attributes of policy problems and their implications for problem-solving 
remain an under-researched aspect of the MLG literature. 
This symposium addresses the challenges of problem-solving in multilevel governance by 
adopting a particular focus on the attributes of the policy problems – whereby instances of 
policy problems are Brexit, the European Semester, the governance of health risks, 
environmental governance, and the enforcement of EU law. We adopt Sabatier’s (2006: 3)  
encompassing definition of policymaking as a process in which “problems are conceptualized 
and brought to government for solution; governmental institutions formulate alternatives and 
select policy solutions; and those solutions get implemented, evaluated, and revised.” Problem-
solving can thereby be conceived of either as a process, for example, a specific policymaking 




et al. 2019b). Or we can think of problem-solving from an outcome-oriented, operational 
perspective, that is, whether and how a policy achieves results that solve the original policy 
problem at stake (Thomann and Sager 2017). Accordingly, problem-solving happens at 
different stages of the policy cycle such as decision-making, instrument choice, and policy 
implementation. 
In this introduction, we contribute to the literature by reviewing and synthesizing the existing 
scholarship on policy problems and problem-solving in MLG. This review addresses two 
questions: first, what are the relevant attributes of policy problems? We propose to extend the 
previous work by Peters (2005) and Hornbeek and Peters (2017) in order to account also for 
the uncertainty and tractability of policy problems, as well as for political attributes (power, 
conflict, and salience). And second, how do policy problems relate to different modes of 
problem-solving in multilevel governance? We then outline how the contributions of this 
symposium illustrate the link between the attributes of policy problems and the unfolding of 
corresponding problem-solving processes in multilevel governance. 
2 Policy problems in multilevel governance 
The choice of governance tools should match the characteristics of a given policy problem. Yet, 
as Peters (2005: 349) points out,  
“Although conceptions of policy design have well-developed conceptions of the 
instruments used to address public problems, they have much less developed 
conceptions of those problems themselves.” 
Hoornbeek and Peters (2017: 369) define a policy problem as a situation in which society and/or 
political systems define and frame particular disconnections between the current state of affairs 




the nature of policy problems requires to acknowledge that the characteristics of policy 
problems are seldom “objectively given” or set into stone. Instead, the definition and framing 
of problems is fundamentally subjective, prone to social and political constructions and change 
(Chisholm 1995; Turnbull and Hoppe 2018). The ways in which policy problems are defined, 
put on the political agenda, framed, and tackled depend, for example, on the social construction 
of target groups in society as regards their power and deservingness (Schneider and Ingram 
1997) and other biases (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Problem definition and framing are also 
decisive for understanding mechanisms and outcomes of problem-solving in multilevel 
governance (Peters 2005; Chisholm 1995). Accordingly, Hoornbeek and Peters (2017: 381) 
stress that: 
“the assessment of problems is tied to the ways in which political processes yield 
definitions of policy problems. Indeed, the very definition of a problem as a 
disconnection between existing conditions and desired states of affairs means that some 
persons(s) or group(s) must agree on desired states of affairs (Hoppe, 2010). This 
process of determining how policy-makers will define what is desirable is inherently 
political and it means that recommendations for policy design and policy 
instrumentation will be tied to the underlying politics associated with the problem’s 
definition to at least some degree.” 
If problems are socially constructed, this raises the question of what counts as an accurate 
problem definition (Turnbull and Hoppe 2018). Dery (1984) offers three criteria for a “good” 
problem definition from a problem-solving perspective. First, the definition should fit a feasible 
solution; second, it should be amenable to organizational and inter-organizational action; and 
third, the problem definition should be seen as a realistic opportunity to improve a problematic 
situation according to a majority opinion.  




or problem-solving in multilevel governance? We start by identifying an ongoing discussion in 
the policy sciences about “wicked” policy problems and alternative conceptualizations based 
on the notion of “structuredness”. Related to this, the regulation literature has dealt with issues 
of complexity, conflict, uncertainty, and crisis, and with the appropriate governance responses 
to them. Furthermore, research on policy implementation distinguishes different degrees of 
“problem tractability” and emphasizes the importance of issue salience. These different 
concepts overlap to some extent. Yet they also point to different attributes of policy problems 
which have most comprehensively been captured with a recent synthesis of the attributes of 
policy problems (Peters 2005; Peters and Hornbeeck, 2017). Our review enables us to refine 
and complement Peters’ (2005) model in order to account for aspects of policy problems that 
are sensitive to social and political construction. 
2.1 “Wicked” or “unstructured” problems 
Borrowed from the planning literature, the concept of “wicked” problems draws a distinction 
between ordinary or “tame” policy problems and complex, intractable, open-ended, and 
unpredictable policy problems for which conventional strategies or techniques do not apply 
(Alford and Head 2017; Newman and Head 2017; Rittel and Weber 1973). Wicked problems—
and even more so “super wicked” problems (Levin et al. 2012)—are often seen as immune to 
linear, rational or scientific methods of problem-solving (Newman and Head 2017).  Given that 
Rittel and Weber (1973) propose no less than ten criteria for wicked problems, the concept is 
too vague to be meaningfully confined to certain problems only, and difficult to operationalize 
empirically (Alford and Head 2017; Peters 2017). The answers to the question of what wicked 
problems are and how they should be tackled vary widely (Turnbull and Hoppe 2018) although 
a recent review identifies increasing agreement between authors (Danken et al. 2016). 




(falsely) distinguish all social problems from science problems—thus, by definition, all policy 
problems are wicked (see also Newman and Head 2017; Peters 2017). Hisschemöller and 
Hoppe (1995) reiterated in Turnbull and Hoppe (2018), argue instead that problems differ in 
the degree they are well-defined or structured. Ill-structured problems are difficult to manage 
effectively and defy the development of simple policy designs (Peters 2017). This 
structuredness or “problematicity” of problems comprises two elements. On the one hand, 
policy problems vary in the extent to which there is agreement or conflict about underlying 
values and norms about means or ends of the policy. The most extreme manifestation of this 
can be with so-called morality policies that concern fundamental questions about which no 
compromise is possible (Engeli and Varone 2011; Mooney, 1999: 675; Thomann 2018b). The 
other dimension of “structuredness” is the extent to which certainty about the required and 
available knowledge needed to address a policy problem.  Uncertainty corresponds to risks for 
which it is impossible to assign probabilities to their occurrence (Tosun 2013).  Similar to 
Hisschemöller and Hoppe (1995), Alford and Head (2017) propose a nine-fold typology of 
wicked problems along two main dimensions. First, the complexity of the problem refers to the 
question whether the problem and/or its solution is clear. Second, the difficulty with respect to 
stakeholders relates to the propensity of those involved to enable the problem to be properly 
addressed. This includes the locus of relevant knowledge, the existence of conflicting interests, 
and the relative power of policy managers and stakeholders. 
 
2.2 Problem tractability and issue salience 
Issues of uncertainty, complexity, and conflict have also been discussed under the umbrella 
term of “problem tractability”. Schrefler (2010) for instance defines problem tractability as the 




and whether the medium-and long-term consequences of possible policy approaches are 
unknown or risky. Alford and Head (2017: 404) provide a somewhat different definition 
according to which a problem is tractable when neither knowledge nor interests are fragmented 
between the managers and the stakeholders, and neither has a relative power advantage. A 
“moderately intractable” problem prevails when knowledge is fragmented among various 
parties, taking time and effort to access, but the stakeholders broadly consent or are at least 
indifferent about the nature of the problem and the possible solutions. Finally, an intractable 
problem is where both knowledge and interests are fractured among the various actors. 
Hisschemöller and Hoppe (1995) in turn define intractable problems as fully unstructured 
problems with low certainty about the relevant knowledge and a lack of consensus regarding 
norms and values where policymakers almost inevitably persevere in addressing the “wrong” 
problem and do not take seriously certain viewpoints or interests. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) provide a more distinctive and principled definition of problem 
tractability as those aspects of a social problems which affect the ability of actors involved in 
the policy process to achieve the policy’s objectives (see also Thomann 2019). This entails three 
questions. First, is there a clear understanding of the behavioural changes necessary to resolve 
the problem? This can be measured through the availability of valid technical theory and 
technology. Second, is the behaviour of the regulated target group heterogeneous, does it 
involve a large proportion of the population? We can capture this aspect through the diversity 
of target group behavior, as well as the size of the target group in relation to the population. 
Third, how extensive is the amount of behavioural change required? In this vein, Thomann 
(2019), for instance, distinguishes “micro-issues” that refer to very rare situations, merely 
administrative procedures, and/or imply only negligible costs or benefits for the addressees, 
from macro issues that refer to frequently occurring situations and have notable consequences 




Research on agenda setting and policy implementation has also emphasized the importance of 
issue salience for how actors react to different policies (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Versluis 
2003, 2007). Salience is about to the visibility of and the importance attached to a topic, the 
main indicator being public attention. As such it captures an important aspect of how problems 
and target groups are shaped by social and political processes. Salience can indicate either the 
high importance of a policy or its political contestation (Versluis 2003). When responding to 
EU policies, domestic actors pick and choose where to focus their attention and tend to ignore 
issues they deem less salient (Spendzharova and Versluis 2013).  
2.3 Policy problems: an integrated approach 
Peters (2005; see also Hoornbeek and Peters 2017) suggests seven attributes of policy problems 
that are relevant for problem-solving. In assuming that policy problems are “real” and have 
relatively unambiguous characteristics, Peter’s (2005) framework is more “objectivist” than 
other approaches (Hoornbeek and Peters 2017). We now discuss Peter’s (2005) criteria and 
integrate the previous discussion (see Table 1). We argue that Peter’s list neglects some relevant 
attributes of policy problems. First, uncertainty is a core attribute of policy problems. Moreover, 
the notion of problem tractability put forward by Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) is more 
precise than Peter’s (2005) categories of scope and scale in capturing relevant aspects of 
problems which affect the ability of policy implementers to achieve the policy’s objectives.  
Finally, the list does not feature key attributes that are shaped by the politics of problem-solving. 
We identify three political attributes in the literature: power, conflict, and issue salience.  
 
Table 1: Synthesis of attributes of policy problems 
Attribute Definition 
Core attributes of policy problems 
Solubility Can the problem be solved?  




Complexity How complex is the problem? 
Political or programmatic (causal and technical) 
Scale  Is the problem a large one that is not subject to disaggregation? 
Uncertainty Unpredictability of occurrence and effects of solutions  
Attributes tied to instruments 
Divisibility Are the solutions divisible—can they be disaggregated to the advantage of particular 
constituencies? 
Monetarization Is the problem identified and/or solvable in terms of money? 
-- 
Scope Are there large numbers of persons, organizations, or activities involved in creating the 
problem? 
Interdependence Can the problem be addressed well by a single agency or ministry? 
Tractability Aspects of problems affecting the ability of policy implementers to achieve the policy’s 
objectives: 
- clear understanding of the behavioural changes required 
- diversity of target group behavior and size of the target group 
- extent of behavioural change required 
Political attributes 
Power Relative power of managers and stakeholders 
Conflict Degree of agreement or conflict about underlying interests, values and norms (means or 
ends) 
Salience  Visibility of and importance attached to a topic 
Source: adapted from Hoornbeek and Peters (2017: 367). Bold: attributes added by authors. 
 
According to Peters (2005), three core attributes of policy problems are solubility, complexity, 
and scale. 
Problem solubility refers to the question whether a problem has a finite and definable solution 
or whether it is an acute and chronic problem that is likely to appear again and again on the 
agenda of government (Peters 2005). As such, (in)solubility bears resemblance with wicked 
problems resisting a clear solution as well as with the aspect of (un)certainty defining problem 
structuredness. It also emphasizes the time dimension as it the case with “super wicked” 
problems. 
Complexity is a multi-faceted attribute of policy problems. Political complexity refers to the 
number of different actors involved, and hence the difficulty of reaching an agreement among 
them. Political complexity has also been discussed in view of the potential conflict resulting 
from diverging values and interests in the wicked problems and structuredness literature, which 




aspect of problem tractability. Programmatic complexity can refer to the extent of technical 
expertise required to understand the problem. Moreover, and importantly, there can be multiple 
and competing causal models for a given policy problem, which leads to conflict among experts 
(Peters 2005: 358-359). The wicked problems literature refers to programmatic complexity 
when arguing that some problems defy a full understanding of their nature and implications. 
The scale of the questions confronting government refers to the magnitude of the problem and 
the range of the effects it can produce—which determines whether a problem can be 
disaggregated into smaller, manageable components, or whether it requires a comprehensive 
solution or nothing at all (Peters 2005: 360-361). This aspect is somewhat discussed in the 
wicked problems literature and it is also somehow reflected in the definition of crises, but it 
does not range amongst the characteristics of “problem structuredness”. Finally, scale is related 
to the question of the extent of behavioral change required by a policy, as an aspect of problem 
tractability.  
Peters (2005) adds four further attributes that are tied to instruments, namely divisibility, 
monetarization, scope, and interdependence. 
Divisibility refers to the nature of the resources required to solve the problem. Essentially, 
problems that entail collective action and produce diffuse benefits may be more difficult to 
solve than when benefits are more immediate and more appropriable by individuals, as it is 
difficult to generate and maintain support for policies that yield only indirect benefits to 
particular constituencies (Hoornbeek and Peters 2017; Peters 2005). To a degree, divisibility 
may express itself through issue salience; however, it is an aspect of policy problems that other 
strands of literature tend to have neglected. 
Monetarization refers to the question whether a policy problem can be addressed using money 
and subsidies. This aspect influences which solutions are discussed and how prominent 




wickedness, structuredness, or problem tractability. 
The scope of activity or behaviors that contribute to the creation of the problem can also vary.  
This refers essentially to the number of people, activities, and organizations involved with a 
problem, and to the extent to which these are well-defined. This in turn relates to the broader 
question of government capacity to carry out different activities (Lodge and Wegrich 2014). 
The scope of activity is one pillar defining wicked problems with respect to stakeholders. Scope 
is the core idea underlying the more refined definition of problem tractability put forward by 
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980). 
Interdependence captures how policy problems vary in the extent to which they are confined 
or confinable to a single policy domain (Peters 2005). This relates to the extent to which policy 
problems lie within the jurisdiction of single ministries, agencies or organizations. 
Interdependence affects the difficulty and controversy in the selection and implementation of 
instruments. Interdependence is one key aspect defining wicked problems (interrelatedness and 
multitude of stakeholders). 
In sum, Peter’s (2005) list of problem attributes captures most attributes considered as relevant 
in the different strands of literature on policy problems. It also includes other, neglected 
attributes such as divisibility and monetarization, and the relevance of time for solubility. As 
Hoornbeek and Peters (2017) admit, this list of policy attributes is rather long. When analyzing 
a given set of policy problems, there are various ways in which the attributes can be aggregated 
into a more parsimonious conceptual structure. Some attributes may be more analytically or 
practically relevant than others, depending on the given context (Table 1). 
3 Notions of problem-solving and their link with policy problems 




problem identification, problem representation, generating alternatives, and selecting solutions 
(Chisholm 1995). However, there is in fact a broad variety of very different understandings of 
problem-solving in the literature. The contribution by Irepoglu Carreras (2019) shows how the 
different understandings of problem-solving are reflected in different strands of the MLG 
literature. We adopt the encompassing definition developed by Maggetti and Trein (2019: 3), 
according to which problem-solving implies that the policy- and other decisionmakers in charge 
of defining, deciding, implementing, and evaluating policies: 
“(a) Make policies in the sense of “puzzling” (on society’s behalf) as opposed to 
“powering” (Heclo 1974); So as to (b) deal with problems that are perceived important 
for society by organized groups and/or by policymakers themselves (Cohen et al. 1972); 
Through (c) the cooperative production of a policy output that is expected to be 
collectively beneficial in making a contribution to solve the policy problem at stake 
(Elgström and Jönsson 2000).” 
As Trein et al. discuss (2019), problem-solving entails political action intended to solve policy 
problem. This definition can include both problem-solving processes and the outcomes of such 
processes. We now discuss prominent notions of problem-solving in policy analysis and link 
them to policy problems. 
3.1 Procedural notions of problem-solving 
Procedural notions of problem-solving include amongst others problem structuring, a 
collaborative decision-making mode, learning and knowledge utilization, and problem 
management. 
Problem structuring. Hisschemöller and Hoppe (1995) argue that policymakers can 




unstructured to more structured problems. For structured, technical problems (with high levels 
of certainty and high consensus on values and norms), a “rule strategy” of policymaking is 
applied that relies on rules to achieve clearly defined goals as effectively as possible. For 
moderately structured problems with unclear means but clear ends, a “negotiation strategy” 
serves to address the conflict about the means to reach the policy goal most effectively and 
efficiently. For moderately structured problems with clear means but unclear ends, an 
“accommodation strategy” serves the aim of finding a compromise about the values most 
relevant in the conflicting parties. This strategy often focuses on procedural means to enable 
future consensus (e.g., Engeli and Varone 2011). For fully unstructured problems, 
Hisschemöller and Hoppe (1995) suggest a “learning strategy” which focuses on integrating, 
evaluating, and deliberating contradictory information and arguments. 
Collaborative decision-making. In the context of EU policymaking, problem-solving has been 
discussed as a specific procedural pattern of negotiation and decision-making between member 
states in the early drafting process of an EU policy, focusing on how interests are 
accommodated and actors coordinate. In contrast to bargaining, problem-solving is 
characterized by actors concentrating on joint production, common interests, and “creating 
value” rather than distributive issues and self-interest in order to focus on problem analysis, the 
definition of objectives, and the finding of possible solutions involving multiple attempts and 
trial and error (e.g., Scharpf, 1999; Benz 2000). Thus, problem-solving in the EU is painted as 
comparatively denationalized and dominated by technical, scientific, and legal expertise 
(Heritier 1996). Several features of the EU polity can be conducive to this mode of problem-
solving: the continuity of negotiations fostering norms of stable reciprocity and cooperative 
solutions, informal codes of conduct and a consensual culture, and feelings of solidarity 
emerging from interpersonal relationships during negotiations (Elgstrom and Jonsson 2000).  




Trein (2019) suggest that problem-solving entails “puzzling” on society’s behalf. In his seminal 
book, Heclo held that, 
“Governments not only “ power” (or whatever the verb form of that approach might be); 
they also puzzle. Policy-making is a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf; 
it entails both deciding and knowing. The process of making pension, unemployment, 
and superannuation policies has extended beyond deciding what “wants” to 
accommodate, to include problems of knowing who might want something, what is 
wanted, what should be wanted, and how to turn even the most sweet-tempered general 
agreement into concrete collective action” (Heclo 1974, 305). 
In this understanding, problem-solving is a collaborative decision-making style in which 
policymakers intend to solve the policy problem, i.e., seek policy solutions, and not only pursue 
their own narrow political agenda. 
Divisibility matters for this kind of problem-solving: Policymaking regarding non-divisible 
policy problems may suffer from collective action problems which complicate building support 
for a policy (Hoornbeek and Peters 2017). Accordingly, problem-solving processes have been 
attributed mainly to distributive and regulatory types of policy problems (Elgstrom and Jonsson 
2000; Heritier 1996). Moreover, whether or not problem-solving takes place is a matter of issue 
salience. Falkner (2016) argues that how EU integration unfolds will depend on how the crisis 
and crisis-induced problem-solving needs are being interpreted and communicated. Joint 
problem-solving can be promoted as an answer to recent crises in the EU within an “integration-
friendly” framing of crisis.  Hoornbeek and Peters (2017: 367) further specify how problem 
attributes affect policymaking processes. For instance, solubility influences whether a problem 
can be addressed through a one-time intervention or requires ongoing efforts. Moreover, 
complexity suggests a need to focus on processes: political complexity requires reaching a 




research (see below about knowledge utilization). Problems that lend themselves to 
monetarizations may involve policymaking processes that revolve around expenditures. 
Policymaking processes tend to be very complex for problems with a broad scope; and 
interdependence exacerbates difficulties in the policymaking process. 
Learning and knowledge utilization. An important dimension of problem-solving in 
multilevel governance is learning, defined as “the acquisition of new relevant information that 
permits the updating of beliefs about the effects of a new policy” (Braun and Gilardi 2006: 
308). Learning is a process that results in collective products such as new shared ideas, 
strategies, rules, or policies (Heikkila and Gerlak 2013: 486; Treib et al. 2018; Zito and Schout 
2009). Learning can involve the instrumental use of scientific knowledge in policymaking. 
The tractability of policy problems directly influences whether and what kind of learning takes 
place for instance when assessing risks, engaging in regulatory impact assessment or other 
forms of evidence-based policymaking. This is because it is easier to define the payoffs 
associated with different courses of action when tractability is high. Thus, we would expect in 
multilevel governance to apply standard operating procedures and engage in top-down 
hierarchical of bargaining-based modes of learning under conditions of high problem 
tractability. Conversely, when policy problems are intractable, more bottom-up, reflexive, 
epistemic, and contingent modes of learning come into play (Dunlop and Radaelli 2018). 
According to Schrefler (2010), knowledge utilization should especially occur in situations of 
low problem tractability and low levels of conflict around a policy. Conversely, when conflict 
is high the use of scientific knowledge should be symbolic. For more tractable policy problems, 
knowledge is expected to be used instrumentally or strategically. 
It has been argued for the EU that the success of these different learning strategies should 
interact with the extent of differentiation (Zito and Schout 2009). Several properties of what 




influence the success of learning, such as its “publicness”, levels of ambiguity or uncertainty, 
available information and technology. Moreover, conditions of crisis development and 
termination define how a crisis progresses over time (e.g., fast-or slow-burning, cathartic or 
long shadow) which may facilitate or hinder learning (Kamkhaji and Radaelli 2017). In the EU, 
events such as the euro crisis have led to intensive learning within crises, such as in the form of 
“contingent learning” as a fast, surprise-triggered understanding of how cue-outcome 
associations work; but also more gradually between crises over time (Falkner 2016; Kamkhaji 
and Radaelli 2017).  
Knowledge utilization is also a key aspect of the use of the precautionary principle which is a 
procedure used to handle uncertain regulatory risks in the EU. In the event of a potential risk, 
even if this risk cannot be fully demonstrated or quantified or its effects determined because of 
the insufficiency or inclusive nature of the scientific data, the precautionary principle enables 
policy makers to take regulatory action before risks materialize in order to prevent unnecessary 
harm. Typically such policies impose constraints on the actions of target groups (e.g., bans on 
the production or sale of certain products), subject to review when new scientific data becomes 
available (Thomann 2018a; Tosun 2013; Trein 2018). 
Managing wicked problems. The literature consistently suggests two remedies to manage 
wicked problems (Danken et al. 2016). First, cross-boundary collaboration is important, with 
the involvement of external stakeholders, inter-organizational collaboration among 
governmental bodies, and networked forms of governance. Second, public leadership and 
management matter, in terms of distinct managerial skills and collaborative competences. 
Lodge and Wegrich (2014) further emphasize the crucial role of administrative capacity in 
terms of delivery, coordination, regulation, and analysis for tackling contemporary crises of the 
states’ problem-solving capabilities. They argue that the way in which substantive and 




determined by specific problem constellations (Lodge and Wegrich 2014: 17). The successful 
use of instruments in turn depends on administrative capacities, and vice versa. These 
governance capacities lie increasingly outside the boundaries of the state, being tied into a 
network of public, private, and arguably multilevel governance systems.  
3.2 Operational notions of problem-solving 
As Thomann and Sager (2017a, b) highlight, there is a more operational understanding of 
problem-solving which refers to the results of decision-making, that is, the extent to which 
policy problems are effectively being addressed (see Peters and Pierre 2016).1 This perspective 
significantly broadens prominent notions of problem-solving by highlighting the fact that 
decision-making goes on after policies have been adopted, during the phases of implementation 
(Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980), policy evaluation, and the maintenance, revision, or 
termination of policies. Thus, from a results-oriented perspective, not only the “goodness” of a 
policy decision, but also the goodness of implementation become key. Hoornbeek and Peters 
(2017: 378) note the importance of interdependence for operational problem-solving:  
“Interdependent problems engage multiple organizations, and this increases the 
complexity of achieving resolutions to the problem. By contrast, problems that are not 
interdependent in this manner may be more easily addressed.” 
One consequence of the management of interdependent problems is that there is a demand for 
                                                 
 
 
1 This focus on effectiveness seems to underlie some of the earlier work of Scharpf (1997, 2003). In these earlier 
works, successful problem-solving means effective coordination of the involved actors (and their interests) 




coordination, and potentially even the integration, of existing policies and organizations. 
Therefore, decisionmakers tackle complex problems, such as environmental protection or 
climate change, with integrated strategies and reforms (Trein et al., 2019a). 
Jordan (1999) presents a 2x2 matrix for analyzing problem-solving in operational terms (Weale 
1992), see Figure 1. On the one hand, the result of decision-making can be a policy output, that 
is, "the laws, regulations and institutions that governments employ in dealing with policy 
problems" (Weale, 1992: 45) and policy outcomes which refer to "the effects of those measures 
upon the state of the world" (ibid). On the other hand, problem-solving can be seen as the 
question whether policy outputs and outcomes correspond to objectives set out by policymakers 
(“conformance”; cells 1 and 2), or the focus can be whether policy outputs or outcomes are 
actually suitable responses to address the underlying policy problem (“performance” as in cells 
3 and 4; see also Thomann  and Sager 2017a).  
 
Figure 1: Operational understandings of problem-solving 
  Focus of analysis 





E.g. legal compliance 
2 





E.g. policy evaluation 
Source: adapted from Jordan (1999: 72). Examples are our own (non-exhaustive). 
 
These operational understandings or problem-solving are less prominently the focus of MLG 
studies, but nonetheless relevant. Understanding problem-solving beyond policy adoption in 
MLG invites the researcher to consider the insights from the literatures on policy instrument 
choice, legal and practical policy implementation and enforcement (Scholten 2019; Treib 
2014), regulatory quality (Radaelli 2004), and policy evaluation (Pattyn et al. 2018).  




problems and operational problem-solving is that of instrument choice (Howlett and Cashore 
2009). For instance, Hoornbeek and Peters (2017: 377) point out that: 
“The scope of activities giving rise to a problem affects the means used to address it. Where 
many individuals and organizations are involved in the problem, solving the problem 
becomes a more complex endeavour that may need to be addressed by a wide range of 
policy designs and instruments. Conversely, where the scope of activity is narrow, focused 
regulatory policy instruments may be reasonably employed to address the problem.” 
Moreover, scale influences the need to invest in big solutions commensurate with the problem 
at hand (Hoornbeek and Peters 2017). Peters (2005: 361-362) notes that from an operational 
perspective, scale is to an extent a question of instrument choice: 
“The style of policy making in Europe tends to be large scale, at least in terms of gaining 
compliance among the member states. This style can be contrasted with that in other 
multilevel governance arrangements (…) in which the components of the union are 
granted more latitude in interpreting central government policy, and are more 
autonomous. The drive for conformity has to some extent been lessened by the adoption 
of the Open Method of Coordination (…) and its emphasis on benchmarks and standards 
rather than regulations, so that the scale of the policy system may be lessening.” 
Hoornbeek and Peters (2017: 367) outline how insoluble problems should be addressed by 
instruments that address the continuing nature of the problem. The incremental use of targeted 
policy instruments can help with small-scale problems, but would be less useful for large-scale 
problems. One can address divisible problems with policy tools that build support from policy 
beneficiaries, but non-divisible policy solutions may require broader support. Problems of 
narrow scope are easier to address with regulatory solutions than problems with broad scope. 





Implementation and enforcement. Policy implementation and enforcement crucially serve to 
maintain the delicate balance between the governmental and supranational elements in the EU 
(Jordan 1999: 69; Scholten 2019; Thomann 2019).  Particularly,  
“the troublesome implementation of EU environmental policies is a microcosm of the 
wider story of integration and the conflicting forces and contradictions which have 
characterised the EU throughout its journey from an intergovernmental agreement to a 
multilevel polity. These contradictions include the maintenance of unity in diversity, the 
competition between national priorities and supranational imperatives, and the 
distribution of powers between actors at different spatial levels of government. If 
anything, they are more starkly revealed in the implementation phase when the EU\s 
policies are put to the test than at earlier stages in the policy process, where symbolic 
gestures and rhetorical commitments are more likely to secure consensus. 
Implementation is at the sharp end of the EU policy process, where a burgeoning 
supranational legal order meets a decentralised policy delivery system dominated by 
states.” (Jordan 1999: 87). 
Oneexample of operational problem-solving is the “customization” of EU policies by member 
states, where the latter adapt and change the former to domestic preferences and contexts 
(Thomann 2019). Moreover, operational perspectives highlight the varieties of what could be 
“successful” problem-solving—procedural, programmatic, or political (Marsh and McConnell 
2010; Weaver 2014), while the EU MLG literature often reduces this to the question of 
compliance with EU decisions (Treib 2014). On the other hand, the a policy implementation 
perspective offers important insights into how problem tractability and issue salience as well 
as levels of ambiguity and conflict interact with different (EU) governance and implementation 
modes when affecting actual implementation success (Heidbreder 2017; Matland 1995; 





4 The contributions of the symposium 
The symposium contributions scrutinize the interactions between formal aspects of multilevel 
systems and policy problems, especially in order to understand “governance in turbulent times” 
(Ansell et al. 2017). They analyze how the characteristics of policy problems shape problem-
solving dynamics in multilevel governance, from different perspectives but always focusing on 
“critical cases”, that is studying cases of multilevel governance of wicked problems and cases 
of disintegration by applying a comparative perspective. In doing so, these studies provide 
valuable information on how multilevel governance arrangement can deal with such difficult 
problems.  
The article by Papadopoulos and Piattoni (2019) deals with learning in the European Semester. 
The authors discuss some of the problems with the credibility and eventually the problem-
solving capacity of the European Semester (ES). Especially, the authors underline four 
problems with the Semester. Firstly, they point to a democratic deficit that stems from the 
dominance of the executive and bureaucracy over parliamentary actors. Secondly, they hold 
that the strict budgetary rules pre-empt a solution based on collaboration and learning. Thirdly, 
the authors suggest that asymmetric intergovernmentalism results in bargaining instead of 
learning. Fourth, the paper contends that the strict conditions for Eurozone members outside 
the European Semester is a further impediment to learning. 
The authors start out by linking policy ownership to learning, in the context of European 
governance. They hold that, in the European Semester, learning should happen in a reflexive 
mode. After that the authors point the reader to the dominance of the executive as well as the 
sidelining of parliaments and absence of the public in the decision-making, in the European 




of fiscal rules through European regulations and the rulings of the European Court of Justice, 
is an impediment to learning because it creates rules that limit reflexive learning and flexible 
policy adoption. Furthermore, the structure of intergovernmental bargaining in EU fiscal 
politics and the ES undermines learning because the European Council fosters decision making 
through bargaining amongst member states. 
The authors conclude with a pessimistic outlook on the problem-solving capacity of the 
European Semester. “Ultimately, a “puzzling” and problem-solving approach characterizing 
multilevel governance within the ES is of relatively limited relevance compared to the 
“powering” aspects of European economic governance” (Papadopoulos and Piattoni 2019). 
This paper makes an important contribution to understanding how attributes of the policy 
problem are linked to problem-solving. 
The article by Versluis et al. (2019) focuses on the swine flu pandemic as an instance of a 
complex problem tackled in multilevel settings. A core insight concerns the role of uncertainty 
in the regulation of this type of problem and how this uncertainly is managed and communicated 
by policymakers. The swine flu pandemic represents indeed a crisis moment that was relatively 
novel, unforeseen, fast-moving, and whose scope and consequences were not easily predictable. 
What is more, the surrounding scientific knowledge was not very firm, being based on limited 
empirical evidence and theoretically speculative models. 
The authors then show how policy responses vary considerably between different levels as the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and the EU dealt with the same problem in distinctive ways. 
One the one hand, the WHO did not explicitly addressed the uncertainty surrounding the 
pandemic. It rather adopted a prescriptive approach that has been criticized for overstating the 
pandemic’s expected outcome and for its lack of transparency. On the other hand, the EU 
agencies in charge of the matter paid much more attention to existing uncertainty and were 




recommendations, national reactions to the pandemic varied greatly, due to a number of 
contextual political factors. The conclusion by the authors points to the usefulness for 
governmental organizations to provide uncertainty information. Conversely, without openness 
about the unknowns, decision making may become negatively politicized, which in turn 
produces undesirable side-effects and is less conductive to problem-solving. 
The contribution by John-Erik Fossum (2019) uses the example of Brexit in order to inform 
and improve existing notions of problem wickedness. Fossum convincingly demonstrates how 
Brexit can be seen as a prime example of a wicked problem. The problem is hard to define: it 
is not clear what Brexit really is a problem of, and public opinion is very polarized. Moreover, 
there is no stopping rule for establishing when the issue is resolved and who has the right to 
take ultimate decisions. Brexit also involves fierce struggles over key political and societal 
values, its effects are likely to be irreversible, and it is a problem without a clear solution. Brexit 
is moreover a unique problem and in many ways a symptom of other, social and economic, 
problems.  
The question the article explores then is: how can the case of Brexit inform our understanding 
of wicked problems?  In so doing, Fossum argues that a key aspect for understanding the wicked 
problem of Brexit and potential approaches to solving it is that of what he calls political order. 
He defines political order as two core meanings: a settled order, or orderliness as the presence 
or absence of rules. Along these two dimensions of political order (polity change/ structural 
reconfiguration, and orderliness), he outlines four possible scenarios for Brexit. Fossum argues 
that the neglect of political order in the literature on wicked problems is problematic because 
matters of political order and change have implications for terms under which policy-making 
takes place. Using the example of the Good Friday Agreement, Fossum demonstrates that 





He concludes that the policy literature has tended to focus on cognitively or politically 
demanding issues, which has enabled them to focus on policy substance. However, structurally 
or normatively demanding problems tend to become heavily politicized and questions of value 
and political order tend to appear, which gives a different meaning and significance to wicked 
beyond the realm of policy. Thus, Fossum’s contribution is a welcome step toward integrating 
political perspectives into the study of policy problems in MLG, as we have suggested in Table 
1 above. Simultaneously, Fossum demonstrates the relevance of policy perspectives for 
analyzing contemporary issues of EU integration.  
The paper by Irepoglu Carreras compares the problem-solving capacity of federal states, 
notably Germany and the EU. The paper focuses on climate change action, which is an 
important case for problem-solving in multilevel contexts. Irepoglu Carreras discusses how the 
structure of the multilevel policy, the agency of different levels of government, and the 
interaction between them impacts on the outcome in the process of problem-solving. Through 
an extensive review of the existing literature, this article discusses the interplay of structure, 
agency, the process, which is essentially coordination, and the outcome of the problem-solving 
process. 
The article proceeds with a discussion of why we need to take an encompassing theoretical 
approach to studying problem-solving that links structure and outcome through processual 
aspects. The author emphasizes that the processual aspects of problem-solving entail both a 
bottom-up and a top-down perspective. Against the background, the paper proceeds with a very 
well researched survey of the literature problem-solving in climate change action and its 
relation to environmental policy in the EU and in federal states, with a focus on Germany. The 
paper does a very good job in summarizing these strands of literature without getting lost in the 
details. 




explicitly on the structural elements related to problem-solving, such as the construction of the 
polity. More implicitly, the federalism literature focuses on the outcome dimension, and 
assesses for example policy convergence or divergence between levels. On the other hand, the 
multilevel governance literature focuses explicitly on the process of problem-solving, for 
example through functional differentiation in task-specific jurisdictions. Furthermore, the 
multilevel governance literature focuses implicitly on the agency of problem-solving. 
Taken together, this symposium proposes a renewed, conceptually and empirically improved 
and broadened emphasis on the study of problem-solving in the EU and in multilevel 
governance more generally. With this introduction we propose conceptual tools to study these 
phenomena, and link attributes of policy problems with notions of problem-solving. The 
contributions illustrate the rich variety with which the EU responds to problem in its political 
processes and institutional architecture. In a next step, research should tackle not only 
procedural, but also operational notions of problem-solving more systematically. A better 
understanding of how the EU responds to different types of policy problems is an important but 
neglected step toward generating theoretical and empirical knowledge about the actual extent 
to which MLG can improve the output legitimacy of governance, that is, actual problem-solving 
(Trein et al. 2019b). Given the current legitimacy challenges facing EU integration but also 
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